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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
33 years ago.6 In New York, where the privilege of recovering taxes has
been extended to foreign states by statute,7 the courts are still citing Colo-
rado v. Harbecks and announcing that "the policy of this state denies ac-
cess to its courts for this purpose." 9
It is submitted that despite the dogmatic language of the American Law
Institute' O and of a text writer,"' there is a fighting chance for a courageous
tax collector who is willing to cast his lot with those who think that the
Milwaukee County dictum foreshadows a future Supreme Court decision
requiring extraterritorial enforcement of state revenue laws. The present
state of the authorities was perhaps best summed up by Mr. Justice Stone
in the Milwaukee County case when he said that it remains an open ques-
tion in this court1 2 whether one state must enforce the revenue laws of an-
other.
F. S.
C mrNAL LAw-HABITUAL CRmINALS-EFFECT OF PARDONED OFFENSr-
[California].-Defendant was convicted of grand theft in California and
with two prior convictions of felonies in Texas, was sentenced to life im-
prisonment under the California Habitual Criminal Act. The defendant had
been granted a pardon for these prior offenses in Texas. Did these pardons
relieve him from the increased punishment prescribed for habitual crimi-
nals? Held, The California statute is general in nature and therefore is all
inclusive. Since there is no special provision excluding persons who were
pardoned after conviction, such persons are necessarily included in the
general provisions of the statute.
2
6. Holshouser v. Gold Hill Copper Co. (1905) 138 N. C. 248, 50 S. E.
650, 70 L. R. A. 183.
7. N. Y. Laws (1932) ch. 333.
8. (1922) 232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357.
9. In re Cornell's Estate (1933) 149 Misc. 553, 267 N. Y. S. 649, 652.
See also Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Trust Co. (1937) 161 Misc. 903, 294 N. Y.
S. 648, 673.
10. Restatement, Conflicts (1934) sec. 610: "No action can be maintained
on a right created by the law of a foreign state as a method of furthering
its own governmental interests." This is declared by comment (c) to refer
to claims for taxes. Restatement, Conflicts (1934) sec. 443 declares: "A
valid foreign judgment for the payment of money which has been obtained
in favor of a state, a state agency, or a private person, on a cause of action
created by the laws of the foreign state as a method of furthering its own
governmental interests will not be enforced." Comment (b) states that the
enforcement of such a judgment is not required by the full faith and credit
clause. But cf. Milwaukee County v. White (1935) 296 U. S. 268, 275, 56
S. Ct. 229, 233, 80 L. ed. 220, 226.
11. "No court will give effect to the fiscal law of another state." Stum-
berg, Conflict of Laws (1937) 153.
12. (1935) 296 U. S. 268, 275, 56 S. Ct. 229, 233, 80 L. ed. 220, 226.
1. Cal. Penal Code (1931) sec. 644.
2. People v. Biggs (Cal. 1937) 71 P. (2d) 215.
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Most courts agree that the pardoning power is an executive function and
that no legislative act can limit the effect of an unconditional pardon, which
relieves the offender from all legal consequences.8 The authorities both
legislative and judicial are in conflict as to the effect of a pardon on the
liability of a defendant to suffer an increased penalty for a subsequent
conviction. The weight of authority is that the pardon is immaterial and
that the defendant may be adjudged a prior offender and given the increased
punishment as such.4 The rationale of the courts is that a pardon relieves
the convict of the entire penalty incurred by the offense, but cannot relieve
him from any penal consequence resulting from a different offense com-
mitted after the pardon. The legislative power has provided in these
statutes for a severe punishment for repeated crimes. The increased pen-
alty is not a new or additional punishment for a prior offense.5
The statutory provisions for increased punishment for habitual criminals
differ in the various states. In a considerable number of the states the
statutes expressly provide for the increased punishment for a crime com-
mitted after conviction of a prior offense, and a discharge therefrom by
pardon or otherwise.6 Most states, however, which have adopted habitual
criminal acts are silent as to the effect of pardon. They refer simply to
"prior convictions" or to persons "previously convicted" making no other
qualification or explanation save that the defendant must have served a
term of imprisonment therefor.7
The statutory provisions concerning the locality of the prior convictions
in foreign states have also differed. Some jurisdictions, notably New York,
provide that previous convictions must be in the same state, and will not
recognize convictions obtained in other jurisdictions.8 Nevertheless, most
3. Ex parte Garland (1867) 4 Wall. 333, 32 How. Prac. 241; Easterwood
v. State (1895) 34 Tex. Crim. 400, 31 S. W. 294.
4. People v. Carlesi (1913) 154 App. Div. 481, 139 N. Y. S. 309, aff'd(1913) 208 N. Y. 547, 101 N. E. 1114, aff'd (1914) 233 U. S. 51, 34 S. Ct.
576, 58 L. ed. 843; Mount v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1865) 2 Duv. 94; Herndon
v. Commonwealth (1899) 105 Ky. 197, 88 Am. St. Rep. 303, 48 S. W. 988;
William v. People (1902) 196 Ill. 173, 63 N. E. 681; State v. Austin (1893)
113 Mo. 538, 21 S. W. 31; State v. Christup (1935) 337 Mo. 776, 85 S. W.
(2d) 1024; Samuel Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt (1915) 28
Harv. L. Rev. 647; Comment (1931) 22 J. Crim. L. 122; Comment (1930) 14
Minn. L. Rev. 293; Comment (1930) 3 So. Cal. L. Rev. 438.
5. Mount v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1865) 2 Duv. 94.
6. N. Y. Cahill's Crim. Code (1928) art. 90, see. 1020-22; R. S. Mo. (1929)
sec. 4461; Kan. Gen. Stats. (1935) sec. 21-107, 21-108; Okl. Stats. Ann.(1936) Penal Code ch. 15, art 6, sees. 1817-1820.
7. Ill. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stats. (1935) ch. 38, sec. 601; Ind. Burns Stats.
Ann. (1938) vol. 4, sec. 9-2207, is silent as to effect of pardon but court
held in Kelley v. State (Ind., 1933) 185 N. E. 453, that the legislature must
be deemed to have had in mind the effect of a pardon at common law in
absolving an offender of all legal consequences of conviction when it en-
acted the Habitual Criminal Act. Likewise, Ky. Carroll's Stats. Ann.(1936) sec. 1130, is silent as to effect of pardon on prior offense, but court
held in Mount v. Commonwealth (Ky., 1865) 2 Duv. 94, and Herndon v.
Commonwealth (1899) 105 Ky. 197, 48 S. W. 989, 88 Am. St. Rep. 303, that
such a pardon had no effect on this act.
8. People v. Caesar (N. Y. 1823) Park Cr. 645.
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jurisdictions provide in their statutes that convictions had in other states
for offenses punishable in the state where the offense is perpetrated shall
on conviction for any subsequent offense within that state be subject to
the same punishment as though such first conviction had taken place in
that state.9
A minority of states hold that a pardon reaches both the punishment
prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender thus releasing the
punishment and blotting out the existence of the guilt so that, in the eyes
of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense.") It has been explained 1 that the minority rule grew out of a
misinterpretation of the statement by Bracton in giving the English law of
pardon.12 Upon closer examination of Bracton's treatise it is seen that his
views do not support decisions of the minority group. He only intended a
pardoned man to be entitled to restoration of his citizenship, to the right
to testify, and to the rights of suffrage.
Nebraska has provided in its habitual criminal act that if the convicted
person had been previously convicted and pardoned for the reason that he
was found innocent then he shall not come under the provisions of the
statute."3 This provision places Nebraska on middle ground and would seem
to be the most just and equitable method of handling the situation. Both
the majority and the minority rule work an injustice to a fairly great ex-
tent, the majority rule in not taking cognizance of the fact that there are
pardons granted to people found completely innocent, and the minority rule
in being too liberal with hardened criminals.
L. R. K.
TAXATION-DEDUCTIONS FROM FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-UsE op MoRTALITY
TASLES--[Federal].-Deceased devised the residue of his estate to his
nephew to be held in trust until he was 29 years of age. If the nephew
died before reaching that age the trust fund was to be used for the erection
9. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 4462; Ky. Carroll's Stats. Ann. (1936) sec. 1130;
Neb. Comp. Stats. (1929) sec. 29-2217; Old. Stats. Ann. (1936) Penal Code
ch. 15, art. 6, sec. 1817-1820; State v. Christup (1935) 337 Mo. 776, 18 S.
W. (2d) 1024; McDonald v. Commonwealth of Mass. (1901) 180 U. S. 311,
21 S. Ct. 389 45 L. ed. 542; Kan. Gen. Stats. (1935) sec. 21-107, 21-108;
Cross v. State (1928) 96 Fla. 768, 119 So. 380.
10. Ex Parte Garland (1867) 4 Wall 33, 32 How. Prac. 241; Ex Parte
Collins (1925) 32 Okl. Crim. App. 6, 239 Pac. 693; State v. Martin (1898)
59 Ohio St. 212, 52 N. E. 188, 43 L. R. A. 94; Edward v. Commonwealth
(1883) 78 Va. 39; Kelley v. State (Ind. 1933) 185 N. E. 453.
11. Samuel Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt? (1915) 28 Harv.
L. Rev. 647.
12. Zwess' Translation, Vol. 2, p. 371: "Pardoned man is like a new born
infant and a man as it were lately born."
13. See Neb. Comp. Stats. (1929) sec. 29-2217, where an habitual criminal
is defined and it is said that "if person so convicted shall show to the satis-
faction of the court before whom such conviction was had, that he was
released from imprisonment upon either of said sentences, upon a pardon
granted for the reason that he was innocent, such conviction and sentence
shall not be considered as such under this act."
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